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INTRODUCTION 
The thesis of this paper is twofold. First, there is the general 
concern to investigate and demonstrate clearly that there are relation-
ships between certain superficially unrelated disciplines, namely 
philosophy, aesthetics, and literary criticism. Second, by way of 
accomplishing the first aim, there is an attempt made to synthesize 
and explicate the contributions of a significant twentieth century 
intellectual. The particular procedure employed to attain these ends 
is the cQnsideration of an academic field which is continually being 
reshaped by other separate but related disciplines. For my purposes 
the figure of Jean Paul Sartre and the field of literary criticiSl.; 
are both, as shall be demonstrated, appropriate for this investigation. 
The format for analyzing Sartre's literary criticism shall be as 
follows. (1) There is an 1investigation of Sartre's philosop~fcal 
claims. (2) There follows a discussion of Sartre's view of lite, ture, 
Its value, Significance, and role in society. (3) The next section 
relates Sartre's views of literature to traditional problems in liter-
ary criticism. (4) In the final portion there is a brief evaluation 
of Sartre's contributions to a contemporary literary criticism. 
1 
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JEAN-PAUL SARTRE'S THEORY OF LITERATURE 
The evaluation of the work of a contemporary figure is never easy; 
Ind when the figure is as controversial IS Jean-Paul Sartre. the task 
becomes doubly difficu1t . l Besides the obvious fact that at any moment 
the living philosopher may add to. and thus change. the body of his work. 
we already have at our disposal. a voluminous literature of great variety. 
Sartre has written philosophy. novels. plays. screen scenarios. and lit-
erary and social critiCism; during the maturer years only poetry seems to 
have escaped his attention.Z 
In order to interpret this massive body of primary and secondary 
literature. can we construct a body of principles which will ena&le us 
to evaluate Sartre's contribution. if any. to philosophy and literary 
criticism? I think we can; and the number of such prinCiples need not 
• be excessively large . First. although the social message communicated 
by existenti31ism was adopted in extreme form by the younger generation 
seeking liberation partly from the arbitrary decisions of parents and 
partly from the political strictures imposed by the occupying Germans. 
we should admit that the head of a movement is not necessarily respon-
sible for the conduct of hi s would-be followers. In the second place. 
IJean-Pau1 Sartre. L'lmafnation (3rd ed.; Pari s; 'Presses 
Universitaires de france, 1950 • passim. Introduction. See also the 
pre-reflective j09ito. Jean-Paul Sartre. L'Etre et 1e neant (Paris: 
Ga11imard. 1943 • pp. 16-23. 
ZSartre. L'Etre et 1e neant. pp. 23-27. Later in L' Etre et 1e ~ being-in-Itself i s given two additional characteristics . 
Z 
we can avoid the extremes of unthoughtful acceptance or rejection of the 
philosophy in favor of an impartial analysis of its claims, only if we 
can ls01ate the distinguishing marks of that philosophy. For this task, 
the third, it is not unreasonable to separate the literary efforts of 
Sartre from his already dense bodY of purely philosophical works. The 
claim here is not that literature cannot be philosophy, but that his-
torically considered, the literary interpretations of his philosophy are 
secondary; they were initiated, in the main, merely to reach that larger 
section of his audience which is composed of readers for whom philosophy 
is too forbidding a fare. Les "ouches illustrates, but does not defend, 
the thesis of personal freedom; La Putain respecteuse illustrates, but 
does not defend, the bad faith of society; Le Diable et Ie Bon Dieu 
Shows the consequences in a fictional context of personal choices of 
good and evil, as the unfinished tetralogy, Les Chemins de la li6erte, 
shows the plight of the existentialist individual, in the role he estab-
lished, "condemned to be free. oJ 
Only one of Sartre'~ novels has a truly ambitious character. It 
is generally held that La Hausee holds a peculiar status among the works 
of the author.4 Is it an essay or a novel? Is its purpose to illustrate 
without defending a thesis, or to develop an idea which will later be 
defended at greater length? It certainly can be read as either, and if 
we are inclined to consider it here as an essay rather than as a novel--
as it should be, according to its ,publlsher5--our reasons are historical 
3Elton , ed., Essays. 
4Cleanth Brooks, The Well Wrought Urn, passium. 
5Santayana, Sense of Beauty,' p. 9. 
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rather than textual. Textually, the theme of La Hausee is the subjec-
tive reaction to the discovery of one's personal existence as a free 
and responsible individual. If it presents a philosophy, it is a philo-
sophy considered as a philosophy of life. But as a matter of historical 
fact, the theme of freedom as the defining property of consciousness was 
11 ready expounded In the first of Sartre's works, L'Imaginatlon, which 
appeared In 1936. The psychological case history suggesting the connec-
tion between the freedom of consciousness and the experience of 
metaphysical anguish is described in an article of the Recherches 
Phllosophlgues of 1936-37. La Hausee appeared In 1938. To this extent, 
La Hausee represents Illustration of a thesis. But freedom is not In 
easy thesis to uphold in an age of territorial occupation or of philo-
sophical positivism. A thoughtful reader of the book could recognize 
4 
the thesis, but would feel unsatisfied at the lack of evidence for it. 
How is this freedom possible? This is the question Sartre spent so much 
effort trying to answer, first in L'Imaginare (1940) and at still greater 
length In L'Etre et Ie Ne.nt (1943). ~n the historical relations of 
these texts are thus established, the ambivalent nature becomes more 
apparent; it fits into the general sequence of Sartre's work, making I 
clear-cut stage in the development of his thought; but at the same time, 
the style of the work is predominantly literary rather than analytic. 
Besides his books, Sartre has written several articles of a purely 
philosophical nature, the consideration of which sheds light upon the 
development of his early philosophy. In addition to "La transcendance 
de l ' Ego," he has presented "La s t ructure intentlonnelle de l'image," 
in Revue de I-Ietaphysique et de I~orale, 1938. Both of these indicate 
the extreme dependence of Sartre's beginnings on the world of Edmund 
Husserl, a subject to which I shall return. The second of these articles 
appeared as the first section of l'Imaginaire. A third article, "Une 
idee fondamentale de la phenomenologie de Husserl, intentionnalie" 
(Nouvelle Revue Francaise, 1939) was written in the conCise, almost 
Poetic style identified with the person of Alain,6 and appeared in the 
same journal as the essays of the latter. The article herald·s a new 
theory of the paSSions, which Sartre took the trouble to outline in a 
book published by Hermann in the sane year, [squisse d'una theorie des 
emotfons. 
5 
Finally, there appeared two books of , more special interest. The 
first of these is l'[xistentialiisme est un humanisme. Since this Work 
is nothing but a series of offhanded answers by Sartre to unconnected 
questions concerning his theories, we would cautiously extend the meaning 
of "primary source" should we inClUde it in that capaCity. It apjleared 
in 1946, well after the theoretic.1 justification of Sartre's philosophy 
had been attempte4. 
In sum, the follOWi.jg gives. selective bibliography for pri-
mary Sources of the early Sartre. The arrangement is by date 01 
appearance, no respect being p.id the distinction between bOOks and 
articles: 
1. l'Imagination, 1936. 
2. "la transcendance de l'ego," Recherches Phflosophoques, 1937. 
3. La Nausee, 1938. 
4. "La structure intentionnele de I'image," Revue de Hetaphysigue et de Mora Ie, 1938. 
5. "Une id e fondamentale de la phenomenologie de Husserel, 
I'intentionnalite," Nouvelle Revue Francaise, 1939. 
6Ibid . , p. 10. 
-
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Husserl. a subject to which I shall return. The second of these articles 
appeared as the first section of ~'Imaginaire. A third article. "Une 
idee fondamentale de la phenomenologie de Husserl. lntentlonnalie" 
(Nouvelle Revue Francalse. 1939) was written in the concise. almost 
poetic style identified with the person of Alain.6 and appeared in the 
same journal as the essays of the latter. The article heralds a new 
theory of the passions. which Sartre took the trouble to outline In a 
book published by Hermann in the same year. Esquisse d'una theorle des 
emotions. 
Finally. there appeared two books of a more special interest. The 
first of these Is L'Existentiallisme est un humanisme. Since this work 
Is nothing but a series of offhanded answers by Sartre to unconnected 
questions concerning his theories. we would cautiously extend the meaning 
of "primary source" should we Include it in that capaciQt. It ap"jleared 
in 1946. well after the theoretical justification of Sartre's philosophy 
had been attempted. 
In sum. the followi,lg gives a selective bibliography for pri-
mary sources of the early Sartre. The arrangement is by date of 
appearance. no respect being paid the distinction between books and 
articles: 
1. L'lmagination. 1935. 
2. "la transcendance de L'ego ," Recherches Philosophoques. 1937. 
3. La Nausee. 1938. 
4. "la structure intenti onnele de l'image." Revue de Hetaphysique 
et de Morale. 1938. 
5. "Une id e fondamentale de la phenomenologie de Husserel. 
l'intentionnalite." Nouvelle Revue Francaise. 1939. 
6Ibld •• p. 10. 
6 
6. ESquisse d'une theorie des emotions, 1939. 
7. L 'Imaginare, "1940. 
8. L'Etre et Ie neant, 1943. 
9. Qu'est-ce que la litterature?, 1947. 
Keeping in mind that anY day there may appear further contributions 
to his work we might consider this list definitive for our purposes. 
The question that remains is, "What can be done with such a list?" 
I propose to isolate the peculiar problem posed by the entire list of 
works, to point out the distinctive marks of the method adopted by Sartre 
to solve this problem, and finally to evaluate briefly Sartre's claims 
to having solved the problem by the methods he has adopted . 
As has been pointed out, the key philosophical work relevant to 
our inquiry is Sartre's L'lmagination (1936). In brief this wor~ is con-
cerned with a. traditional epistemological problem: the problem of 
perception. According to L'lmagination, a perceiver intuitively becomes 
aware of himself as a spontaneous individual while "intending" external 
: 
objects by means of images. 7 Consider an object. Given normal circum-
stances whi1elooking at an object, a perceiver in th i s case is reporting 
on an immediate impression of an object, which i n some sense is located 
outside the perceiver in his perceptual field . When the subject closes 
his eyes, an image of the object may remain awhile before disappearing. 
When this after-i mage disappears it can be said that the object ceases 
to exist fo r the subject, but there is no reason to believe that the 
object ceases to exist in-itself. This external object, for Sartre, is 
7Jean-Paul Sartre, L'Ima}ination (3rd ed.; Paris: Presses 
Universftaires de France, 1950 , passim, Introduction. 
deffned as befng-in-itself. The defi~fng characteristfc of thfs per-
cefved object fs merely the fact that ft fs, that ft may become the 
object of someone's perceptual experfence.S 
The percefving consciousness (subject), on the other hand, cannot 
be the object of someone's perception. A perceiving conscfousness does 
not exist for something else. It cannot exist for consciousness since 
it can only be known directly and not by means of images.9 Conscious-
ness, that which exists but does not exist for someone else's perceptfve 
awareness, is said to exist only for ftself. Consciousness fs charac-
terized as existence for itself. 
The result of the above is therefore a distinction between two 
kinds of existence: being-for-itself (subjects or minds), and 
being-fn-itself (objects and body). By establishfng a dualism such as 
this, Sartre now faces a traditional philosophical problem--the mind-body 
problem: what is the nature of the relationship between the body and the 
mind in an event implying both? Sartre spurns the traditional attempts 
made by both the materialists and the idealists to solve this prOble.. 
Taking his clue from the methodological prinCiples set down by Husserl. 
Sartre tries to harmonize this ontological dualism by his own particular 
form of the phenomenological method.10 
In L'lmagination, Sartre examines the views of various classfCll 
thinkers concerning the existence and function of images, showing that 
most of them rest upon an error in ontological assumptions. Sartre 
8Sar tre, L'Etre et Ie neant, pp. 23-27. Later in L'Etre et Ie 
~, being-in-itself is given two additional characteristics. 
9Ibid., pp. 26-27. 
lOlbid., p. 34. 
-
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spells out this erroneous assumption. He argues that, although images 
play different roles in the epistemological theories of Descartes, 
Leibnitz, and Hume, these systems, whether idealistic or materialistic, 
conceive of the image as if it were a thing, an object having the same 
nature as any perceived object. 11 Sartre maintains that the only way 
to avoid the ultimate philosophical proble.s of both the Idealists and 
Materialists is to avoid the initial error of considering an image as a 
thing. The question then is: If an image does not have the ontological 
status of a perceived object, what kind of ontological status does it 
have? 
Sartre sets forth his method of investigation and conclusions 
regarding the nature of an image in his work L'ImA9inaire (1940). In 
this work Sartre comnends a phenomenological procedure as the method 
8 
that best explains the relation of the consciousness to its environment. 12 
In short, the method of the phenomenologist, as Sartre defines phenomen-
ology, is to contemplate an instance of consciousness, reflect on the 
essence of the consciousndss, and offer a description of that essence. 13 
Since Sartre's phenomenological analysis is of images, his procedure is, 
therefore, to produce an image, to reflect upon it, and to describe the 
essence reflected upon. Since any normally-equipped human can verify 
the first two steps, Sartre immediately attempts a description of the 
essence he has intuited from his consciousness. 
llSartre, L'Imagination, p. 19. 
12Jean-Paul Sartre, L'Imaginaire (18th ed. : Paris: Gallimard, 
1948), p. 12 ff. 
13whether this sketch is a true representation of the phenomeno-
logical me~hod is not at issue here. It suffices that this is Sartre's 
adaptatl,on of _the phenomenological method. Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
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Sartre claims to intuit four characteristics essential to the nature 
of an image. The first is that an image is a conscious event , i.e., that 
an image cannot be conceived of as a content. 14 An image is a conscious 
event that is the means by which the consciousness "gives itself an object."15 
The second characteristic is that the imagination intends an unreal object, 
which is not other than consciousness and is, in· fact, constituted by it. 
The unreal object constituted by this consciousness, then, actually has 
no relation to other objects that exist in the world. 16 
Sartre expands this notion of an unreal object as a third character-
istic of the imagining consciousness. Images are said to posit their 
objects as non-existent. In order to understand what is .eant here, a 
comparison of the imagining consciousness, that of quasi-observation, 
with veridical perception ~ be helpful . A truly perceptual image, 
according to Sartre, refers to a t.ranscendent object. (Sartre us·its 
"transcendent" in its Kantian sense: being beyond the l1mits of possi-
ble experience.) The perceptual consciousness poses the existence of. 
, 
real object. The imaginative consciousness, Oft the other hand, may posit 
the existence of its object, in one of four ways: as non-existent, as 
absent, as existing in some imaginary context elsewhere , or as making no 
ontological claim whatsoever. Each of these pOSitional acts bear an ele-
ment of negation, and this negative element constitutes the essence of 
the imagining consciousness. The imagined object is given, but given in 
a particular way; it is given as absent. 17 
14Ibid., p. 15. 
15Ibid., p. 17. 
16Ibid., pp . 19-22. 
171bid., p. 25. 
-
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Sartre explains this idea of negation: In order to have an i .. ge 
produced by the imagining consciousness, the world must recede into noth-
ingness for the act of consciousness. Like a figure and its background, 
the image and the world are complementary. In short, "The intentional 
object of the imagining consciousness has this particularity: either it 
isn't there and is pOSited as such, or it doesn't exist, and is pOSited 
as non-existent or not posited at all."18 
The final characteristic of the image, according to Sartre, is its 
spontaneity. Continuing his phenomenological investigation of the image 
Sartre says that the image, which is a consciousness, reveals itself to 
be creative. The object of an image does not determine the conscious 
image because the object of the imagining consciousness is, as we have 
seen, non-existent. Whereas in a perception the consciousness is to some 
extent passive, being determined by the object, in an act of imagining, 
the consciousness is completely free and self-determining. The force of 
this assertion is that images can be conjured at will. In short, the 
image owes nothing to its fobject since the object is instantiated and 
maintained--as non-existent--in the act of imagining. I' It Is because 
of this spontaneity that artists are said to be creative. 
After outlining the four .,sential characteristics of an image, 
Sartre gives a summary definition for the term "image" in its generic 
sense. 
IS"L 'objet intentionnel de la conscience imageante a eeci de 
particulier qu'il n'est pas la et qu'il est pose comme tel, ou encore 
qu'il n'existe pas et qu'il est pose comme inexistant, ou qu'il n'est 
pas pose du tout."--Ibid., p. 25. 
19 Ibid., pp. 25-26. 
••• an act which, in its corporeity, aims at an absent or 
non-existent object by means of a physical or psychical 
continuent which is not given in itself, but in the guise20 of an 'analogical representative' of the object aimed at. 
11 
Having a sketch of the nature of the image that is produced by the 
imagination, we now move to a consideration of the imagination. Since 
the imagination, according to Sartre, functions at its highest (most 
spontaneous) degree when it creates its own object, and this is assumed 
to be the case in aesthetic experience, we proceed to consider Sartre's 
theory of aesthetics. 
Sartre's comments on the aesthetic object occur as the second part 
of his conclusion to L'Imaginaire. In this conclusion he tries to solve 
certain outstanding aesthetic questions by his phenomenological psychol-
ogy of the imagination. Although Sartre talks in his psychology of the 
imagination (L'Imaginaire) about the status of art works in gene~al, he 
speaks at greater length in Qu' est-ce que la litterature? about the sta-
tus of literary works in particular. Our concern with these two texts 
will be to discuss the ideas set forth concerning the imagination in the 
! 
production and appreciation of works of art and not a discussion of the 
aesthetic problems Sartre thought he could resolve with his psychologi-
cal theories. 
Sartre employs his concept of the imagination, which according to 
him is freely creative, to explain the creation of art works. Sartre 
begins by discussing the creative process from the point of view of the 
creator, or as Sartr~ would put it, to describe the function of the 
20u • • • un acte qui vise dans sa corporeite un objet absent ou inexis-
tant a travers un continu physique ou psychique qui ne se donne pas en 
propre, mais a titre de 'representant analogique' de l'objet vise."--
L'Imaginaire. p. 75. 
-
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Imagination In the production of an art object. A prime requisite for 
such a description is an adequate account of the artist's freedom. which 
according to Sartre. no determinist psychology can provide. In L'Imaglnaire 
we have seen that Sartre was attempting to describe the conditions which 
permit the appearance of images to consciousness; an image. in his view. 
is a spontaneous. conscious event in which the attitude of the subject Is 
a quasi-observation of a non-existent or absent object. But the subject 
is in the world. and can intend an object which is not in the world. and 
can intend an object which is not In the world only by negating the rele-
vance of the objects of the world for the given experience. 
To entertain an image Is to constitute an object on the mar-
gins of the totality of the real world; thus to hold the real 
world at a distance. to free himself from It. In a word. to 
negate i t. 2l 
The meaning of this claim is simply that one can only have ,.an 
Image when he is marginally aware of the world; when he frees himself 
from the real world. In other words. the existence of an Image pre-
cludes from the world of objects the presence of that object which appears 
• 
in the imagination. In short. the conditions necessary for the appear-
ance of an image are the ability to posit the existence of the world of 
objects which appear in an act of perception and in a succeeding act of 
consciousness to posit the inexistence of the imagined object within that 
world. 22 
In order to appreciate the phenomenological model of the creative 
imagination and its relation to aesthetic experience. we will first 
21"Poser une image c 'est consti~uer un objet en marge de la total·1te 
du reel. c'est done tenir Ie reel a distance. s'en affranchirm en un mot 
Ie nier."-L'Imaginaire • . p. 223. 
22Ibid •• pp. 234 ff. 
13 
briefly lay out a model that conflicts with Sartre's position. The con-
trasting model is a realistic model based upon, but not limited to, 
Alains's (pseudonym of Emile Chartier) suggestion offered in her Systeme 
de beaux-arts (1920).23 In an exceedingly brief manner here is how Alain 
explains artistic creation. 
Like Sartre, Alain appeals to the imagination to explain creation. 
But here psychological resemblances cease. For Alain, the imagination is 
not a faculty for synthesizing, nor is the imagination a means by which 
to refer to unreal objects. Imagination for Alain is false perception. 
Imagination differs from perception as a false judgment differs from a 
true one. According to this theory (realism), the art object is not dis-
tinct from the artifact. The creative process proper to art is the fixing 
of imaginary experience in works of art. As a creator, an artist is not 
a visionary. The artist's vision results from a manipulation of ' his body 
in contact with the external world. His idea is his expression and his 
expression is a physical fact, the artifact • 
• For Alain there are flO images; an imaginary construct is an erron-
eously perceived object. Since emotions are thought to be the source of 
error in human perception, and they are defined as movements of the human 
body, the artist's emotions and works are considered to be one and the 
same thing. The object, which results f~ that actiVity, fixes the 
imaginary experience; the emotion is given an object. Works of art are 
objects corresponding to the physiological processes of the artist by 
which they are created and appreciated. 
23Alain (pseudonym of Emile Chartier), Systeme de beaux-arts (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1920), passim. 
14 
We shall now consider the phenomenol,ogical model offered by Sartre. 
Sartre explains that in his estimation works of art are the creative 
images of the artist and not the concrete artifact produced by the artist. 24 
If the works of an artist are, as Sartre claims, images, and not mere 
objects created by a physiological process, then a distinction is neces-
sary between the artifact and what the artifact means--whatever is 
referred to by the image. This di~tinction allows communication to take 
place in the usual manner; the image intends an object which is under-
stood in its unique sense by the person having the image. Briefly, 
Sartre's phenomenological account of artistic creation is this: an 
artist creates an object when his consciousness intends an absent object 
via the physical object he creates. liThe work of art is an unreal ob-
ject."2S But for there to be a complete act of artistic communication, 
a second consciousness, that of the appreciator, is necessary. The appre-
ciator by assuming the aesthetic attitude intends the same unreal or 
absent object via the image created by the artist . It follows that in 
I 
an act of artistic creation there is a physical object (a presentation, 
or image) which serves as an instrument for uniting two consciousnesses 
in one act of communication. Both consciousnesses intend the same object, 
the unreal, ideal, or absent object, which is the work of art. 26 
We now turn to a consideration of the function of artistic objects, 
in particular, literary objects. In What is Literature? Sartre is quite 
explicit regarding the function of literary works--to permit communicati on 
24Sartre, L'Imaginai re , pp. 239-240. 
2S Ibid ., p. 231. 
26Ibid., p. 239. 
\ 
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between members of society. Art is communication and not empty expres-
sion. literature fulfills its primary function when it acts as a social 
force. 27 And the best way for literature to become a social force in 
addition to being an aesthetic object of worth in Itself, is for the 
author to adopt the point of view of the least favored individuals in 
contemporary society.28 This is the way existentialist authors are 
encouraged to produce changes in their own society and not merely in 
the souls of their readers. 29 Existential literature is committed to 
be social action. It is intended to produce social change by offering 
its audience a conception of the human individual as a free individual 
working out his destiny within an unfriendly environment. Sartre is 
quick to point out, however, that existential literature is not to lack 
aesthetic quality. 
In effect, I Should like to recall that in "committed liter-
ature" the commitment must not, in any case, make one forget 
the litterature, and that our preoccupation must be to serve 
literature in giving it new blood, just as much as to serve 
SOCiety in 3&ying to give it the literature fitting its cir-
cums tances. ; 
As mentioned above, the notion of communication is central to 
Sartre's view of literature. For Sartre, the putting of words on paper 
27Jean-Paul Sartre. What is literature?, trans. and ed. by 8ernard 
Frechtman (New York: Philosophical library, 1949), pp. 67 ff. 
28Jean-Paul Sartre, Situations II (PariS: Gallimard, 1948), 
pp. 261-271. 
29Ibid., p. 16. 
30"Je rappe lie, en effet, que dans 1 a '11 tterature engagee, 
'l'engagement'ne dolt, en aucun cas, faire oublier la litterature et 
que notre preoccupation doit etre de servir la litterature en lui 
infusant un sang nouveau, tout autant que de servir la collectivite 
en essayant de lui donner la Ii tterature qui lui convient. "--Ibid., 
p. 30. 
16 
fs only the begfnnfng of the literary creation which, if it fs to be 
c~lete, must be completed fn the act of reading. Thus the creative 
process involves three parts: the author's productfon, the reader's 
contemplatfon, and the aesthetic object which emerges in the reader's 
mfnd. Sartre's model of communication consists of the union of two 
consciousnesses by the use of language. However, maintaining consis-
tency with his theory and function of i~ges and art objects in general: 
"the lfterary object, though realized through language, is never given 
.!!!. language. 1131 
Wfth thfs note concerning the process of socfal communicatfon in 
mind, we will now trace Sartre's argument as developed in Wha~ 
literature? Sartre begins by asking the question, "Why does one write?" 
He immediately rejects two answers as trivial--some wrfters write to 
escape the undesirable condftions that normally are associated wi~ 
earning a living; others write in order to exercise their will to power. 32 
But whatever the author's motive for writing, the author's decision is 
one of choice. In order lo sense the force of this last assertion one 
must refer to a section of l'Etre et Ie neant in which Sartre explains 
the sense in which man is responsible for the world in which he lives. 33 
Sartre claims that although a man is motivated by the situation surround-
ing him, man is responsible to choose to change his environment or to go 
along with the consequences of accepting the environment as it is. In 
either case a choice must be made. One either chooses to change the 
31Frechtman, Hhat is Literature?, p. 44. 
32Sartre, Situations II, pp. 89-115. 
33Sartre, L'Etre et Ie neant, Part IV, Chapter I. 
17 
situation or chooses not to change the situation. 
An author, like his characters, must choose to reveal the world as 
it is if they are to exercise their freedom of choice responsibly. As 
an artist this is his commitment--to reveal the ~orld as it is. He 
expresses his freedom in addressing himself to the freedom of another • 
••. the writer has chosen to reveal the world and particu-
larly to reveal man to other men so that they may assume 
full responsibility before the object which has been laid 
bare. 34 
Thus, in sharing the writer's situation, the reader shares in the commu-
nicating of freedoms. The condition necessary and sufficient for the 
appearance of a literary object is the participation of the rp.ader in 
the author's attempt to' reveal the nature of the world. It is in this 
communication of freedoms that both the reader and the author f1nd com-
mitment to a specific mode of action through the aesthetic objec~. It 
is at this point that Sartre's critics object: What distinguishes the 
commitment of literature from propaganda? As we have seen (pp. 11,12) 
Sartre refers to the aesthetic properties of the literary work to dis-
I 
tinguish it from mere propaganda. 
We shall now look at the aesthetic qualities of the literary work 
that separate it from propaganda. First we look at the form and subject 
matter of the literary work as recommended by Sartre. The subject mat-
'ter of the literary work is the life of some individual: 
Praxis as action in history and on history; that is, as I 
synthesis of historical relativity and of the moral and 
metaphysical absolute, with this hostile and friendly, 
terrible and deSSsive world which it reveals to us. There 
is our subject . 
34Frechtman, What is Literature?, pp. 12-13. 
35Ibid., p. 239. 
The protagonist is placed in a specific time and place, and the work 
becomes a cultural phenomenon that demands historfcal crfticfSM. 
18 
The form of a work (Sartre means a novel) must be sufted to the 
subject depfcted. Poetfc prose whfch may obscure clear meanfngs, fs 
proscrfbed. Poetry fs excluded on much the same basfs. 36 In Sartre's 
tems, poetry fs not acceptable because the poet uses words "insfde 
out."37 Sartre says that the poet consfders language as a structure of 
the external world rather than as the livfng extension of the poet's own 
body.38 A word, as a sfgn, is fmprecfse. It fntends a meaning. In 
readfng words one may become aware of the physical qualitfes of the 
words themselves and lose intellectual comprehensfon. In order to avoid 
this potential loss of clarity, ·due to poetic language, Sartre forbids 
its use • 
••• the poet has withdrawn from the language-instrument in . ' 
single movement. Once and for all he has chosen t~e poetic 
attitude which considers words as things and not as signs. 
For the ambiguity of the sign implies that one can pursue 
the thing signified, or turn his gaze toward its reality and 
consider it as an object. 39 
f A consequence of these claims is that the style of the author is to be 
regulated by the aim of reader comprehension, and will therefore depend 
upon his audience, rather than upon literary convention or his,. the 
artist's, own personal taste. 
36Ibid •• p. 284. 
37Ibid .• p. 20 . 
38Sartre. l'Etre et le neant, Part III. Chapter II. The literary 
interpretation of this principle follows below. 
39Frechtman. What is literature? pp. 12-13. 
According to Sartre, "The writer is a speaker; he designates, 
. . 
demonstrates, orders, refuses, interpolates, begs, insults, persuades, 
insinuates. "40 The write,. finds himself in a social situation. 
The speaker is in situation in language; he is invested with 
words. They are prolongations of his meanings, his pincers, 
his antennae, his eye-glasses. He maneuvers them from within; 
he feels them as if they were his body; he is surrounded by a 
verbal body which he is hardly aware of and which extends his 
action upon the world.41 
What follows from the novelist's situation? A point of view: .Since 
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we were situated, the only novels we could dream of were novels of sit-
uation, without internal narrators or all-knowing witnesses. ,,42 Therefore, 
the techniques of the omniscient narrator that tend to destroy the aes-
thetic distance of the work are prohibited. Also proscribed is the third 
person, or internal narrator through whose eyes the reader is forced to 
view the work .• 
Sartre rejects as appropriate for the point of view, the analytic 
method used in Newtonian mechanics for the more synthetic notion of 
"Einsteinian relativity."4? The proper point of view in the novel should 
be one-half lucid and .the characters should interact with others only 
half understanding each other. The novel should not have a definite end; 
as in life, the completion of an action in a novel should be tentative. 
There ought to be a suggestion of a given ending, but no possibility of 
other events should be excluded.44 
40Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
41Ibid., p. 13. 
42Ibid ., p. 224,. 
43Ibid., pp. 244 ff. 
44Ibid., pp . 224-225. 
Sartre calls the metaphysical position of existential writers 
"historical relativism. " Existential books are supposed to exist by 
themselves; to be held together by the relations between the characters 
and their environments. 
We hope that our books remain in the air all by themselves 
and that their words, instead of pointing backwards toward 
the one who has designed them (as Alain assumed to be the 
case), will be toboggans, forgotten, unnoticed, and soli-
tary, which will hurl the reader into the midst of a 
universe where there are no witnesses; in short that our 
books may exist in the. manner of things, of plants, of 
events, and not at first like products of man. We want 
to drive providence from our works as we have driven it 
from our world. We should, I believe, no longer define 
beauty by the form nor even by the matter, but by the 
density of being.45 
The existential novel was not to be an abstract dissertation, but 
an idea put in the form of an immediate presentation--a philosophical 
idea existing in the everyday manner of things. In short, a philosoph-
ical idea is not the content of a novel, but it may determine a novel's 
fon. . 
The last step in describing the artist and the work of art is in I . 
relation to the audience. The members of an author's audience are those 
who are capable of reading the words in such a way that their meanings 
fall together into a self-consistent and complete imaginafY whole. What 
Sartre proposes is to enlarge the audience of the existential novelist 
by writing in a style understandable to a larger group of readers. 46 If 
the style does not follow the audience, it is not likely that the audi-
ence will follow the style. Since all men do not live in the same social 
and political situation and do not, therefore , think in the same terms, 
45Ibid., p. 229. 
46 Ibid., pp. 238 ff. 
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it ~ never be possible to write understandably to all men in the life 
span of any given society. In order to reach the largest possible num-
ber of readers. however. some workable idealization of this largest 
possible group of appreciators must be accepted. Sartre finds in the 
Marxist ideal of a classless society the fitting solution to this problem. 
If the public is hopelessly divided into various social and polit-
ical classifications. then as author. to be understood by the greatest 
number of individuals. he must address himself to the whole man as if he 
were "unchssed." The problem of cOl1ll1itting literature to a social func-
tion in the past had been that it (literature) had simply been used by 
the different classes to achieve their own selfish ends. 47 True litera-
ture of cOl1ll1itment must "uncI ass" literature and thus society. Sartre 
calls this unclassed literature litterature totale. 48 Total literature 
integrates the artist with his audience and the audience will all of 
society. The literature becomes authentic in that the writer becomes 
aware that there is no distinction between the subject and the public • 
•.. as long as the vlrtual public remained like a dark sea 
around the sunny little beach of the real public. the writer 
risked coofusing the interests and cares of man with those 
of a small and favored group. But. if the public were iden-
tified with the concrete universal the ,[iter would really 
have to write about the human totality. » 
The final portion of Qu est-ce que la litterature? is an analysis 
of French literature. In brief. his analysis is as follows: from the 
12th to the 16th century. the profession was limited to clerics writing 
for other clerics; in the 16th and 17th centuries. it was preempted by 
47Sartre. Situations II. pp. 9-JO. 
48Ibid •• pp. 26-266. 
49Frechtman. What is Literature? p. 156. 
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the arfstocratfc intelligentsfa, and revolved prfmarfly around the salon. 
But wfth the rfse of the bourgeois in the 18th century, various philo-
Sophfcal pOints ot view, all committed to the technique of analysis, 
were expressed in literature; Sartre mentions these as idealism, psy-
chologism, determinism, utilitarianism, and serfousness, i.e., the 
assumption that one's existence is necessary. In the 19th century 
there was a brief reaction in the form of romantiCism, based upon an 
fdeology which extolled the virtues of the individual as the center of 
feelfng; Sartre felt that the romantics' appeal to human feeling had at 
least the virtue of universal reference. 50 
For a description of the task of the literary critic one must turn 
to the second part of Sartre's Situations II. According to Sartre the 
critic is a member of the author's audience.51 The critic's task is to 
help the general audience to understand the literary work; to widen the 
literary artist's audience to include as many readers as Possible. He 
thus functions in the literary process, Which is baSically a communi c.-I 
tion between consciousnesses. As we have seen, the value of the literary 
work is in diSClosing being in some aspect of its totality; and the 
critic has fulfilled his function when he has analyzed the texture and 
structure of the work under consideration in such a way as to disclose 
the manner in which it reveals the inner" structure of the world.52 All 
efforts on the part of the critic to classify a work according to one 
50Ibid ., pp. 67-157. 
51Sartre, Situations II, p. 38. 
52Ibid., p. 40. 
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or another of its properties will miss the essence of the work itself. 53 
In conclusion, it can be seen that Sartre is a more profound and 
consistent aesthetitician than is commonly recognized. It is not as 
certain, however, that his literary theory is as significant or as ade-
quate. Sartre's distinctive contribution to the theory of literature 
has been his study of creativity (emphasizing the creative activity of 
the aesthetic consumer), and its relation to social function. Sartre's 
goals for committed literature, its aiming at social action and enlarging 
the reading audience place literature in danger of becoming barren of 
aesthetic qualities and merely propagandistic. Although this need not 
necessarily be the case, it is easier to avoid thi~ pitfall in theory 
than in practice, as demonstrated by the fact that Sartre's own liter-
ary themes have become more and more political in their nature. Another 
point worthy of critici$m is Sartre's rejection of poetry and ·poetic 
prose." They have been proscribed because of their tendency to turn the 
..... gaze towards its (an object's) reality and consider it as an object.· 
I logically there has been an error: species (lyric poetry) and genus 
(poetry) have been confused. There have been, after all, poets who 
tried to effect social change and disclose some truth about the world 
by means of their art work. 
Sartre is also open for criticism in his reducing all questions 
concerning style to the principle that one should write in the style 
that more successfull,. ·enlarges the reading audience . Such a capitula-
tion to practical ends may well jeopardize the aesthetic qualities of a 
work. Along ~lith this objection one can challenge Sartre's denial that 
53Ibid . , p. 43. 
24 the fntellectuals should fn fact be the leaders of the world of letters. 
Ffnally, Sartre's afm to "unclass ' Ifterature fs Subject to the SlIM! 
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